The origin of the universe is a matter of extensive debate and inquiry among theologians, philosophers, and scientists. Typically, in Western thought, the notion has been adopted that, whether by divine intervention or by purely naturalistic processes, the universe came to exist ex nihilo (out of nothing). In this paper, I will examine the notion of nothingness, the logical possibility of the universe coming into being out of nothing, as suggested by theists and atheists alike, and offer a possible alternative to the ex nihilo conception of creation.
The argument for creation ex nihilo proceeds as follows:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
As previously stated, this argument is supported by both theists and atheists. For the theist, the ultimate cause of the universe is, of course, God. Through his divine omnipotence, God was able to cause the universe to come into being from a state of nothingness. The Biblical explanation of creation reveals, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep” (MacArthur Study Bible, Gen.1:1-2). Although the Genesis account does not explicitly refer to the universe being created out of nothing, the belief is widely held by theists that this is indeed the case. Identifying a clear-cut first cause for the atheist camp proves much more difficult, as there seems to be no consensus as to what the exact parameters of this first cause might be. In his Critique of Cosmological Arguments, J.L Mackie states,
There is a priori no good reason why a sheer origination of things, not determined by anything, should be unacceptable, whereas the existence of a god with the power to create something out of nothing is acceptable. (225)
Seemingly, Mackie wants to propose a rejection of the idea that a god could create the universe out of nothing by asserting that it is equally as plausible for the universe to arise in an undetermined way out of nothing. Mackie wishes to establish a functional equivalence between God’s creation the universe out of nothing and the universe spontaneously arising on its own out of nothing. If one account of creation out of nothing is reasonable, then why shouldn’t the other be as well? Regardless of atheistic or theistic conception of the ex nihilo argument, implicit in it is the idea that some causal power was able to bring about the existence of the universe out of nothing (or nothingness), and herein lays the problem.
In order to gain a better understanding of the nature of the ex nihilo dilemma, an investigation of the idea of nothingness is in order. First one must consider, is the nothing asserted by the ex nihilo argument even possible? Thomas Aquinas had this to say about nothingness, “If at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus, even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd” (181). Aquinas appears to be telling us that if such a state as nothingness were ever to have existed, then only a state of nothingness would still exist. So, how is it that our first cause (God or otherwise) existed simultaneously with a state of nothingness? Does Aquinas’ assertion not suggest that the existence of the God of the theist and the unspecified cause of the atheist negate the idea of creation from nothing? Does the existence of a cause, however conceived, dispel the prospect of nothingness? An argument against the possibility of such nothingness could be stated as follows:
1. If any one thing or being exists, then something exists.
2. If something exists, then nothingness is not possible.
3. Something exists.
4. Therefore, nothingness is not possible.
Both the theistic and atheistic conceptions of the ex nihilo argument begin with something, a cause, through which the universe is brought about. This is to say that there is at least one thing in existence, the cause itself. If there is something in existence, it is difficult to substantiate the possibility of a coexisting nothingness. If one allows for the possibility that the ex nihilo refers only to state of non-being of the universe, and that the universe was caused to exist where it once did not, does this solve the conundrum? I suggest that it does not. As pointed out by Aquinas, something cannot arise from nothing, so the problem still remains as to how the causal power (God or the unspecified) had the force to bring the universe out of nothing. That is to say, from where did the causal power create the previously non-existent universe?
An alternate argument against creation ex nihilo deals directly with the logical possibility of arriving at something from nothing. The arguments states:
1. If the universe was caused to exist out of nothing, then it is logically possible to create something from nothing.
2. It is not logically possible to create something from nothing.
3. So, the universe was not created out of nothing.
Theists hold that God can only perform actions which are logically possible, so if it is not logically possible to create something from nothing, how might God have created the universe from nothing? Furthermore, if it is not within the realm of possibility for an all powerful being to create the universe from nothing, it is even more difficult to comprehend how an undirected causal power could have done so. So, one is left with a two-fold problem regarding the idea of the creation of the universe ex nihilo. First, how can something (God or another causal power) exist simultaneously with nothingness? And secondly, how did God or some other causal power create something out of nothing?
Unless one is willing to embrace a paradox, which allows for something and nothing to exist concurrently or to accept the idea that something can arise from nothing, which requires relaxing the criteria for what is logically possible, some alternative to the ex nihilo argument is required. One possible alternative to the ex nihilo notion of creation is that the universe gained it existence from the being or “somethingness” of its ultimate cause. Rather than being derived from nothing, the universe emanates from the causal power to which it owes its existence. The being of the universe began to exist as a result of the being of its cause. That is to say, the universe came to exist from something rather than nothing. Whether this cause is God or some non-divine power, the cause still constitutes something and is responsible for the creation of the universe.
For the atheist, this may simply mean that the unidentified causal power (energy, a vacuum, or some type of singularity) contained the necessary potential for the existence of the universe. Rather than spontaneously erupting from a state of nothingness, the universe and all that it contains would have to emanate from this cause. The possibility of time, space, motion, and matter would all have to be contained within the cause itself. Likewise for the theist, all that exists must emanate from the being of God. One formulation of this alternative to creation ex nihilo, for the theist, is panentheism.
Classical panentheism contends that:
All things emanate from the One (God), return to it, and are contained within it. Thus, all things are within the divine One, which infinitely transcends all things…All things are not divine, but all participate in God, who infinitely transcends all. (Cooper, 43)
Giovanni Reale has this to say, “In a certain sense the world itself is in God…the One is not in something else but encloses everything entirely within itself” (Cooper, 43). Panentheism does not make the universe synonymous with God, but rather, places the origin of the universe directly into the being of God. While panentheism solves the ex nihilo dilemma for creation, it presents other problems when contrasted with classical theism. One of these difficulties is that panentheism suggest that the world influences and affects God. The concern is that if God is affected by the world, this suggests a limitation on His power and knowledge and may impede His ability to offer salvation (Cooper, 322-28).
Although panentheism may be criticized in other theological arenas, it offers a plausible alternative to the idea that God created the universe out of nothing. As for characterizing the atheist solution under any particular doctrine, I am not sure that such a doctrine exists. I have sought only to demonstrate the logical concerns surrounding the ex nihilo generation of the universe by any given causal power. By invoking the ex nihilo argument, theists have attempted to set God apart from his creation, and by invoking the same, the atheists have attempted to dismiss the need for God as a causal power. Unfortunately for each group, the chosen path has led to any entirely new concern, namely a universe that rests on what appears to be a logical impossibility.
Works Cited
Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica. Trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948. Pg. 181. Print.
Cooper, John W. Panentheism The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present. Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing Group, 2006. Print.
MacArthur Study Bible, The. King James Version. Author and General Ed. John MacArthur. United States of America: Word Publishing, 1997. Pg. 16. Print.
Mackie, J.L. “A Critique of Cosmological Arguments.” Reprint in The Philosophy of Religion Reader. Ed. by Chad Meister. New York: Routledge, 2008. Pg. 224-5. Print.
Reale, Giovanni. History. 4:370. Reprint in Panentheism The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present by John w. Cooper. Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing Group, 2006. Pg. 43. Print.
Monday, December 20, 2010
Friday, August 6, 2010
Thoughts on World Hunger: Do We Have an Obligation to the Poor?
Should we feed the hungry and offer relief to the poor? Individuals will often offer an in depth and diverse analysis of this question, proposing there is no simple answer. I suggest however, the question is not a difficult one. Rather, to answer, requires only one “simple” action, self-evaluation. What if I were the one in need? What if I were the one hungry? What would I hope for or expect from my community if I were to find myself in this situation? I find it hard to imagine that any person in such a situation would not wish to receive help from his neighbor. Some individuals, of course, have a level of pride which prevents them from seeking help, but once all options for self remedy have been exhausted, I expect that they too would reach out for aid.
In many cases, those individuals attempting to interface with this societal problem begin to dissect the causes of the poverty or hunger, proclaiming that these are important factors to determine whether a person is worthy of assistance. Does the condition of being in need not supersede the “why” and the “how”? Doesn’t the mere fact that one is human offer enough incentive for intervention? Apparently not. Seemingly, individuals feel little to no responsibility to act on behalf of others, who have no access to the resources needed to meet even the most basic survival requirements. That is food and shelter. The idea is somehow entertained (and in some cases may be valid) that people are poor due to their own shortcomings, but in the majority of instances of poverty, I would suggest this claim is a false one.
Commonly, the thought does not seem to prevail that people could be suffering poverty due to a direct limitation imposed on the person by their own or another society. The idea does abound, though, that the poor should be able to save themselves. Often, the poor are blamed for their position and expected to fix themselves, regardless of the true cause of their impoverishment. People often forget to “walk a mile” in the other man’s shoes. It is my opinion that in doing so, the ability to deny assistance to a person in need would be greatly diminished. This type of evaluation places the problem in a shared arena. We become like those who are suffering (if only mentally), and in turn, we accept that their suffering could just as easily be our own.
When suffering is or could be our own, it becomes increasingly difficult to delay solutions to the problem, whatever it may be (poverty in this case). As long as the affliction is separate from us and does not directly impact our lives, we are less likely to be motivated to action. We forget, what is happening to others could soon be happening to us. We live in the safe bubble of our affluence, and we judge with impunity. This, in my opinion, is the root cause of lack of action. If we are to fulfill our obligation to others, be it the poor or anyone, we must first realize our commonality, and from our commonality, we will realize our obligation. Once obligation is realized, there can be no further reasonable procrastination of action.
In many cases, those individuals attempting to interface with this societal problem begin to dissect the causes of the poverty or hunger, proclaiming that these are important factors to determine whether a person is worthy of assistance. Does the condition of being in need not supersede the “why” and the “how”? Doesn’t the mere fact that one is human offer enough incentive for intervention? Apparently not. Seemingly, individuals feel little to no responsibility to act on behalf of others, who have no access to the resources needed to meet even the most basic survival requirements. That is food and shelter. The idea is somehow entertained (and in some cases may be valid) that people are poor due to their own shortcomings, but in the majority of instances of poverty, I would suggest this claim is a false one.
Commonly, the thought does not seem to prevail that people could be suffering poverty due to a direct limitation imposed on the person by their own or another society. The idea does abound, though, that the poor should be able to save themselves. Often, the poor are blamed for their position and expected to fix themselves, regardless of the true cause of their impoverishment. People often forget to “walk a mile” in the other man’s shoes. It is my opinion that in doing so, the ability to deny assistance to a person in need would be greatly diminished. This type of evaluation places the problem in a shared arena. We become like those who are suffering (if only mentally), and in turn, we accept that their suffering could just as easily be our own.
When suffering is or could be our own, it becomes increasingly difficult to delay solutions to the problem, whatever it may be (poverty in this case). As long as the affliction is separate from us and does not directly impact our lives, we are less likely to be motivated to action. We forget, what is happening to others could soon be happening to us. We live in the safe bubble of our affluence, and we judge with impunity. This, in my opinion, is the root cause of lack of action. If we are to fulfill our obligation to others, be it the poor or anyone, we must first realize our commonality, and from our commonality, we will realize our obligation. Once obligation is realized, there can be no further reasonable procrastination of action.
Sunday, August 1, 2010
Clarification on all of this Kant mumbojumbo....
Forward from Facebook with slight revision:
I am trying to work out a categorical conception of God that I can compare to Kant's Categories of Pure Understanding. Like his non-empirical self that exists to make understanding all all experience possible, I think God is a non-empirical preexisting matrix of categorical ideas that make all existence possible (I don't know if Kant or anyone else has commentary on this subject. Perhaps,these would be most akin to Plato's Forms?). I would argue that we can only access these categories intellectually, not physically. The categories would include concepts like infinity or perfection. By comprehending these categories we come to see their necessity in the construct of reality. I really believe if we are looking for God, this is where we should start, not with just our senses. Not just with a scientific experiment. I do think these concepts are in us universally, just like the self is, except the God Categories are not as easy for some of us to recognize. (I have been thinking on this ALL night!)
I am trying to work out a categorical conception of God that I can compare to Kant's Categories of Pure Understanding. Like his non-empirical self that exists to make understanding all all experience possible, I think God is a non-empirical preexisting matrix of categorical ideas that make all existence possible (I don't know if Kant or anyone else has commentary on this subject. Perhaps,these would be most akin to Plato's Forms?). I would argue that we can only access these categories intellectually, not physically. The categories would include concepts like infinity or perfection. By comprehending these categories we come to see their necessity in the construct of reality. I really believe if we are looking for God, this is where we should start, not with just our senses. Not just with a scientific experiment. I do think these concepts are in us universally, just like the self is, except the God Categories are not as easy for some of us to recognize. (I have been thinking on this ALL night!)
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Kant on Space
I thought it might be more helpful to just post this essay....Please forgive the lack of page citations, if anyone is expressly in need of them, I can get them for you.
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant describes space as both transcendentally ideal and empirically real. This declaration creates what might initially be perceived as a paradoxical dilemma. How can space be both something that exists only in the mind, independent of experience (transcendentally ideal), yet also be described as possessing empirical reality, that is, the result of experience? Kant attempts to answer this quandary with a two-fold application of the term [space].
First, Kant treats space as an a priori intuition. He states, “this intuition must, however, be encountered in us a priori, i.e., prior to any perception of an object; hence, this intuition must be pure rather than empirical.” This assertion then raises the question of how the intuition of space can precede sensation of objects themselves. For Kant, the solution to this was that the intuition of space exists as an intrinsic and limiting part of the concept of the subject (the conscious entity capable of perception of objects).
Kant explains this by saying, “The subject’s receptivity for being affected by objects necessarily precedes all [sensible] intuitions of these objects.” That is to say, we must contain within us a preexisting mechanism [our a priori intuition of space] which allows us to order the data delivered to us by our senses. This mechanism allows us to formulate relations between objects of the senses. In this case, namely, how these objects appear to us in terms of spatial relationships.
Next, Kant deals with the empirical aspect of space. Although he claims, “space represents no property whatsoever of any things in themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in relation to one another,” he assures us that space can be (and is) applied both empirically and universally. He tells us, “We can indeed say that space encompasses all things that appear to us externally, but not that it encompasses all things in themselves…” and that, “If the limitation on a judgment is added to the concept of the subject, then the judgment holds unconditionally.”
That is to say, our reception of objects is framed by our preexisting intuition of space, and that all our perceptions of objects conform to the notion they exist in space. This process is universal, with respect to humans, in that we all are limited in our perceptive ability (in regards to objects) by our preexistent (transcendentally ideal) intuition of space (limitation on judgment). For one and all, our ideas of external objects conform to a notion of space. Kant sums this up by telling us:
“That space is real in regard to everything that we can encounter externally as object, but teaches at the same time that space is ideal in regard to things when reason considers them in themselves…Hence we assert that space is empirically real (as regards all possible outer experience), despite asserting that space is transcendentally ideal... (the condition of the possibility of all experience).”
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant describes space as both transcendentally ideal and empirically real. This declaration creates what might initially be perceived as a paradoxical dilemma. How can space be both something that exists only in the mind, independent of experience (transcendentally ideal), yet also be described as possessing empirical reality, that is, the result of experience? Kant attempts to answer this quandary with a two-fold application of the term [space].
First, Kant treats space as an a priori intuition. He states, “this intuition must, however, be encountered in us a priori, i.e., prior to any perception of an object; hence, this intuition must be pure rather than empirical.” This assertion then raises the question of how the intuition of space can precede sensation of objects themselves. For Kant, the solution to this was that the intuition of space exists as an intrinsic and limiting part of the concept of the subject (the conscious entity capable of perception of objects).
Kant explains this by saying, “The subject’s receptivity for being affected by objects necessarily precedes all [sensible] intuitions of these objects.” That is to say, we must contain within us a preexisting mechanism [our a priori intuition of space] which allows us to order the data delivered to us by our senses. This mechanism allows us to formulate relations between objects of the senses. In this case, namely, how these objects appear to us in terms of spatial relationships.
Next, Kant deals with the empirical aspect of space. Although he claims, “space represents no property whatsoever of any things in themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in relation to one another,” he assures us that space can be (and is) applied both empirically and universally. He tells us, “We can indeed say that space encompasses all things that appear to us externally, but not that it encompasses all things in themselves…” and that, “If the limitation on a judgment is added to the concept of the subject, then the judgment holds unconditionally.”
That is to say, our reception of objects is framed by our preexisting intuition of space, and that all our perceptions of objects conform to the notion they exist in space. This process is universal, with respect to humans, in that we all are limited in our perceptive ability (in regards to objects) by our preexistent (transcendentally ideal) intuition of space (limitation on judgment). For one and all, our ideas of external objects conform to a notion of space. Kant sums this up by telling us:
“That space is real in regard to everything that we can encounter externally as object, but teaches at the same time that space is ideal in regard to things when reason considers them in themselves…Hence we assert that space is empirically real (as regards all possible outer experience), despite asserting that space is transcendentally ideal... (the condition of the possibility of all experience).”
Friday, July 30, 2010
Do the Math...Find Yourself...Find God.
Metaphysical reflections....
According to David Hume, there is no self. This fact, that he could find no empirical evidence for the existence of "himself," led him to propose his Bundle Theory[1]. Hume was a skeptic, an empiricist, and is also believed to have been an atheist [2].
I have been thinking for a long time about Hume's problem. I was so offended by his allegation that I did not exist. I could not get it out of my head! Recently though, I feel that I have had a break through. Not just in regards to Hume, but also in regards to understanding my own thoughts on how I know myself and how I know God.
A friend and I had a debate last week about Pascal's Wager [3]. In the course of our discussion, we began to touch on the issue of a lack of empirical evidence for the existence of God. He firmly asserted that he saw no reason to believe what there is no evidence for. As a former atheist, I completely understand his perplexity. Ironically, my friend adamantly declared MATH was something he could put his money on! Not some God for which no evidence could be found!
I began to reflect on my readings in Modern Philosophy and the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge [4]. For an empiricists, like my friend (Although, I do not think he is an atheist.) Hume, and an ever increasing number of other people in this age of Materialism, the only evidence for anything is rooted in our senses. However, even someone as rigorous as Hume allowed mathematics to squeak by as the only a priori knowledge. Reminded of this, I brought the epistemological distinct to the attention of my friend, and tried to lead him to see that not all knowledge is rooted in the senses.
Ultimately, I replied to my friend that a spectrum of evidence limited to the senses was insufficient to deal with the question of God. Just as it is when dealing with the self. Oddly enough, God seems easier to write off than the self when evidence is in question, but taken to the extreme, empiricism will eradicate both. I am not sure that my friend had ever considered that he could have knowledge without experience, as I had not (Thus, my atheism.) until I began to study philosophy.
The pure concept. Math. God. The self. This body of knowledge could possibly be the most fundamental that we posses. But...in order to get to this knowledge, we must move away from our senses and into our minds. Ignorance of our ability to arrive at knowledge without the senses is like a fisherman losing his rod and reel. Not only do we lose the ability to know God, we lose the ability to know our selves, and maybe even our ability to make 2+2=4. We lose the ability to "sustain" ourselves. To quote another friend, to take away our a priori knowledge is equivalent to giving ourselves a lobotomy.
Einstein arrived at his Theory of Relativity through conceptual thought. He used his mind to move beyond what his body could ever experience. This allowed him to produce a pure concept, math so beautiful and elegant, Einstein could not imagine it to be wrong, but it has taken decades (and in some instances nearly a century) for the empirical evidence to catch up with him [5].
Like Einstein's math, do we have to find God with our minds before we can find him with our senses? Theists and Deists, like Einstein, see existence as evidence for God [6]. But what came first? Do they know God as a pure concept, then see God reflected in the world? Or do their senses convince their minds that God is real? Where does the proof of God really lie?
I have come to the conclusion that searching for the proof of God through our senses is futile. I don't think God can live in the world of our senses until he lives in our minds as that pure concept. A pure concept as necessary to the existence of all things as the pure concept of my self is to my existence.
I dedicate this post to Pythagoras, who found God in math, and to my friend, who says math is something he can rely on to be "real."
1. http://www.philosophyofmind.info/bundletheory.html
2. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/#1
3. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/
4. http://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/
5. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,828570,00.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2007/apr/15/spaceexploration.universe
http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/news/3322/einsteins-theory-proven-21st-century-test
http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/solar-sails-einstein-experiment-100726.html
6. http://www.einsteinandreligion.com/
According to David Hume, there is no self. This fact, that he could find no empirical evidence for the existence of "himself," led him to propose his Bundle Theory[1]. Hume was a skeptic, an empiricist, and is also believed to have been an atheist [2].
I have been thinking for a long time about Hume's problem. I was so offended by his allegation that I did not exist. I could not get it out of my head! Recently though, I feel that I have had a break through. Not just in regards to Hume, but also in regards to understanding my own thoughts on how I know myself and how I know God.
A friend and I had a debate last week about Pascal's Wager [3]. In the course of our discussion, we began to touch on the issue of a lack of empirical evidence for the existence of God. He firmly asserted that he saw no reason to believe what there is no evidence for. As a former atheist, I completely understand his perplexity. Ironically, my friend adamantly declared MATH was something he could put his money on! Not some God for which no evidence could be found!
I began to reflect on my readings in Modern Philosophy and the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge [4]. For an empiricists, like my friend (Although, I do not think he is an atheist.) Hume, and an ever increasing number of other people in this age of Materialism, the only evidence for anything is rooted in our senses. However, even someone as rigorous as Hume allowed mathematics to squeak by as the only a priori knowledge. Reminded of this, I brought the epistemological distinct to the attention of my friend, and tried to lead him to see that not all knowledge is rooted in the senses.
Ultimately, I replied to my friend that a spectrum of evidence limited to the senses was insufficient to deal with the question of God. Just as it is when dealing with the self. Oddly enough, God seems easier to write off than the self when evidence is in question, but taken to the extreme, empiricism will eradicate both. I am not sure that my friend had ever considered that he could have knowledge without experience, as I had not (Thus, my atheism.) until I began to study philosophy.
The pure concept. Math. God. The self. This body of knowledge could possibly be the most fundamental that we posses. But...in order to get to this knowledge, we must move away from our senses and into our minds. Ignorance of our ability to arrive at knowledge without the senses is like a fisherman losing his rod and reel. Not only do we lose the ability to know God, we lose the ability to know our selves, and maybe even our ability to make 2+2=4. We lose the ability to "sustain" ourselves. To quote another friend, to take away our a priori knowledge is equivalent to giving ourselves a lobotomy.
Einstein arrived at his Theory of Relativity through conceptual thought. He used his mind to move beyond what his body could ever experience. This allowed him to produce a pure concept, math so beautiful and elegant, Einstein could not imagine it to be wrong, but it has taken decades (and in some instances nearly a century) for the empirical evidence to catch up with him [5].
Like Einstein's math, do we have to find God with our minds before we can find him with our senses? Theists and Deists, like Einstein, see existence as evidence for God [6]. But what came first? Do they know God as a pure concept, then see God reflected in the world? Or do their senses convince their minds that God is real? Where does the proof of God really lie?
I have come to the conclusion that searching for the proof of God through our senses is futile. I don't think God can live in the world of our senses until he lives in our minds as that pure concept. A pure concept as necessary to the existence of all things as the pure concept of my self is to my existence.
I dedicate this post to Pythagoras, who found God in math, and to my friend, who says math is something he can rely on to be "real."
1. http://www.philosophyofmind.info/bundletheory.html
2. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/#1
3. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/
4. http://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/
5. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,828570,00.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2007/apr/15/spaceexploration.universe
http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/news/3322/einsteins-theory-proven-21st-century-test
http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/solar-sails-einstein-experiment-100726.html
6. http://www.einsteinandreligion.com/
Monday, July 26, 2010
The Myth of Decline
In Classical Philosophy, we discussed the myth of progress as seen through the lens of philosophy. Ever abiding questions still haunt philosophical discourse age after age. What is the nature of reality? What is Good? How do we know what we know? Etc... Well, this summer during my British Literature class, I was reading a brief essay in the introduction to the anthology, and I was struck with a queer thought. The essay was discussing the overarching effect societal discontent had on literature. (I searched for the actual citation, but to no avail.) Point being, the century in question (14th-15th-ish)was predominated by thoughts of societal decline. Today, like in ages before us, we teeter on the precipice of uncertainty, and the same apocalyptic rhetoric gaining in popularity today was all the rage hundreds of years ago. Will we pass into the annals of history's paranoids, or will the anxieties of mankind finally come to fruition?
So, here is my perplexity...If progress is a myth and decline is a myth, where does that leave mankind? Are we stuck in a mental quagmire? Do we fail to move at all? Are we at the same point where we started millenniums ago, only differentiated from our ancestors by the quirks of our technologies? Are we going "nowhere" fast? One might be tempted to clap one's hands in exclamation for the fact that we are no worse off than we ever have been or for the many ways we seem better. However, I think this would be a fool-hearted error.
I am disturbed by the possibility of a lack of human motion. To be motionless seems much like what it is to be dead. Einstein's words regarding a "snuffed out candle" come to mind...One giant human invalid, bedridden by its ignorance and self-loathing. Surely, this cannot be the case.
So, here is my perplexity...If progress is a myth and decline is a myth, where does that leave mankind? Are we stuck in a mental quagmire? Do we fail to move at all? Are we at the same point where we started millenniums ago, only differentiated from our ancestors by the quirks of our technologies? Are we going "nowhere" fast? One might be tempted to clap one's hands in exclamation for the fact that we are no worse off than we ever have been or for the many ways we seem better. However, I think this would be a fool-hearted error.
I am disturbed by the possibility of a lack of human motion. To be motionless seems much like what it is to be dead. Einstein's words regarding a "snuffed out candle" come to mind...One giant human invalid, bedridden by its ignorance and self-loathing. Surely, this cannot be the case.
Sunday, June 6, 2010
Cypher Says...
06 June 2010
I have been thinking about the Allegory of the Cave a lot recently. In particular, I have been considering our purposed obligation to descend back into the darkness of the cave in order to help others free themselves. In the “Matrix,” Cypher seems afflicted by a lack of desire to fulfill his duty in this respect. Because of his disillusionment, he prefers to be rebound into the falsehoods and ignorance of his past. Deception is better than danger and adversity. In conjunction with this, Morpheus also cautions Neo about the level of danger of people still inside of the Matrix pose to him. He warns Neo those people still trapped in their dream worlds would do anything to protect the system which enslaves them.
Bearing these two points in mind and as the macabre tale of Socrates himself illustrates for us, enlightenment seems to be dangerous business. Not only do we risk the inability to handle the isolation and removal from everything we once thought true, but we also risk peril from the hands of those very people to whom we are trying to deliver this fine gift.
So how do we avoid becoming Cypher when sometimes it seems too much like the world would just prefer its darkness? Why jeopardize life and limb for those who might destroy us? Does Socrates offer us any torch by which we might light our way as we descend back into the hazardous depth of the cave? Because a “philosophical test for kinship” just does not seem sufficient….
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