Nothing, Something, and the Origin of the Universe

The origin of the universe is a matter of extensive debate and inquiry among theologians, philosophers, and scientists. Typically, in Western thought, the notion has been adopted that, whether by divine intervention or by purely naturalistic processes, the universe came to exist ex nihilo (out of nothing). In this paper, I will examine the notion of nothingness, the logical possibility of the universe coming into being out of nothing, as suggested by theists and atheists alike, and offer a possible alternative to the ex nihilo conception of creation.

The argument for creation ex nihilo proceeds as follows:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

As previously stated, this argument is supported by both theists and atheists. For the theist, the ultimate cause of the universe is, of course, God. Through his divine omnipotence, God was able to cause the universe to come into being from a state of nothingness. The Biblical explanation of creation reveals, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep” (MacArthur Study Bible, Gen.1:1-2). Although the Genesis account does not explicitly refer to the universe being created out of nothing, the belief is widely held by theists that this is indeed the case. Identifying a clear-cut first cause for the atheist camp proves much more difficult, as there seems to be no consensus as to what the exact parameters of this first cause might be. In his Critique of Cosmological Arguments, J.L Mackie states,

There is a priori no good reason why a sheer origination of things, not determined by anything, should be unacceptable, whereas the existence of a god with the power to create something out of nothing is acceptable. (225)

Seemingly, Mackie wants to propose a rejection of the idea that a god could create the universe out of nothing by asserting that it is equally as plausible for the universe to arise in an undetermined way out of nothing. Mackie wishes to establish a functional equivalence between God’s creation the universe out of nothing and the universe spontaneously arising on its own out of nothing. If one account of creation out of nothing is reasonable, then why shouldn’t the other be as well? Regardless of atheistic or theistic conception of the ex nihilo argument, implicit in it is the idea that some causal power was able to bring about the existence of the universe out of nothing (or nothingness), and herein lays the problem.


In order to gain a better understanding of the nature of the ex nihilo dilemma, an investigation of the idea of nothingness is in order. First one must consider, is the nothing asserted by the ex nihilo argument even possible? Thomas Aquinas had this to say about nothingness, “If at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus, even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd” (181). Aquinas appears to be telling us that if such a state as nothingness were ever to have existed, then only a state of nothingness would still exist. So, how is it that our first cause (God or otherwise) existed simultaneously with a state of nothingness? Does Aquinas’ assertion not suggest that the existence of the God of the theist and the unspecified cause of the atheist negate the idea of creation from nothing? Does the existence of a cause, however conceived, dispel the prospect of nothingness? An argument against the possibility of such nothingness could be stated as follows:

1. If any one thing or being exists, then something exists.
2. If something exists, then nothingness is not possible.
3. Something exists.
4. Therefore, nothingness is not possible.

Both the theistic and atheistic conceptions of the ex nihilo argument begin with something, a cause, through which the universe is brought about. This is to say that there is at least one thing in existence, the cause itself. If there is something in existence, it is difficult to substantiate the possibility of a coexisting nothingness. If one allows for the possibility that the ex nihilo refers only to state of non-being of the universe, and that the universe was caused to exist where it once did not, does this solve the conundrum? I suggest that it does not. As pointed out by Aquinas, something cannot arise from nothing, so the problem still remains as to how the causal power (God or the unspecified) had the force to bring the universe out of nothing. That is to say, from where did the causal power create the previously non-existent universe?


An alternate argument against creation ex nihilo deals directly with the logical possibility of arriving at something from nothing. The arguments states:

1. If the universe was caused to exist out of nothing, then it is logically possible to create something from nothing.
2. It is not logically possible to create something from nothing.
3. So, the universe was not created out of nothing.

Theists hold that God can only perform actions which are logically possible, so if it is not logically possible to create something from nothing, how might God have created the universe from nothing? Furthermore, if it is not within the realm of possibility for an all powerful being to create the universe from nothing, it is even more difficult to comprehend how an undirected causal power could have done so. So, one is left with a two-fold problem regarding the idea of the creation of the universe ex nihilo. First, how can something (God or another causal power) exist simultaneously with nothingness? And secondly, how did God or some other causal power create something out of nothing?


Unless one is willing to embrace a paradox, which allows for something and nothing to exist concurrently or to accept the idea that something can arise from nothing, which requires relaxing the criteria for what is logically possible, some alternative to the ex nihilo argument is required. One possible alternative to the ex nihilo notion of creation is that the universe gained it existence from the being or “somethingness” of its ultimate cause. Rather than being derived from nothing, the universe emanates from the causal power to which it owes its existence. The being of the universe began to exist as a result of the being of its cause. That is to say, the universe came to exist from something rather than nothing. Whether this cause is God or some non-divine power, the cause still constitutes something and is responsible for the creation of the universe.


For the atheist, this may simply mean that the unidentified causal power (energy, a vacuum, or some type of singularity) contained the necessary potential for the existence of the universe. Rather than spontaneously erupting from a state of nothingness, the universe and all that it contains would have to emanate from this cause. The possibility of time, space, motion, and matter would all have to be contained within the cause itself. Likewise for the theist, all that exists must emanate from the being of God. One formulation of this alternative to creation ex nihilo, for the theist, is panentheism.


Classical panentheism contends that:

All things emanate from the One (God), return to it, and are contained within it. Thus, all things are within the divine One, which infinitely transcends all things…All things are not divine, but all participate in God, who infinitely transcends all. (Cooper, 43)

Giovanni Reale has this to say, “In a certain sense the world itself is in God…the One is not in something else but encloses everything entirely within itself” (Cooper, 43). Panentheism does not make the universe synonymous with God, but rather, places the origin of the universe directly into the being of God. While panentheism solves the ex nihilo dilemma for creation, it presents other problems when contrasted with classical theism. One of these difficulties is that panentheism suggest that the world influences and affects God. The concern is that if God is affected by the world, this suggests a limitation on His power and knowledge and may impede His ability to offer salvation (Cooper, 322-28).


Although panentheism may be criticized in other theological arenas, it offers a plausible alternative to the idea that God created the universe out of nothing. As for characterizing the atheist solution under any particular doctrine, I am not sure that such a doctrine exists. I have sought only to demonstrate the logical concerns surrounding the ex nihilo generation of the universe by any given causal power. By invoking the ex nihilo argument, theists have attempted to set God apart from his creation, and by invoking the same, the atheists have attempted to dismiss the need for God as a causal power. Unfortunately for each group, the chosen path has led to any entirely new concern, namely a universe that rests on what appears to be a logical impossibility.




Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica. Trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948. Pg. 181. Print.

Cooper, John W. Panentheism The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present. Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing Group, 2006. Print.

MacArthur Study Bible, The. King James Version. Author and General Ed. John MacArthur. United States of America: Word Publishing, 1997. Pg. 16. Print.

Mackie, J.L. “A Critique of Cosmological Arguments.” Reprint in The Philosophy of Religion Reader. Ed. by Chad Meister. New York: Routledge, 2008. Pg. 224-5. Print.

Reale, Giovanni. History. 4:370. Reprint in Panentheism The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present by John w. Cooper. Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing Group, 2006. Pg. 43. Print.